AFDX Library Update Project

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The project page will track all necessary activity associated with protecting SNMP processing from an erroneous/malicious senders of out-of-bounds length fields within the SNMP packet.

Description

After completion of Verification activities in Q2 of 2006 Airbus discovered that erroneous/malicious senders of out-of-bounds length fields within the SNMP packet could cause SNMP processing by the AFDX Library component to hang, and is therefore requiring a change. This component is used on the following programs: ADIRU_Program, IHAS_Program, and SEPDS_Program.

This update has been identified as a must fix for A-380 entry into service.

News

  • 2007-03-01: Albert Mitchell added to the project team.
  • 2007-02-06: Mike Horagn and Harish Jayaraj have been assigned (per the below) and have started work.
  • 2007-02-01: Effort estimates, based upon the assumption that experienced resources will be assigned, are now available.
  • 2007-01-31: Project Kick-off.

Searchable Mail List

Tasks

Initial Budget: $39,116

YTD: $62,865

Current ETC: $14,669

Current EAC: $77,534

Milestones Due Date Estimated Delivery Delivered Percentage Complete
Certification Candidate: Version 4.4.0 12-FEB-2007 12-FEB-2007 9-FEB-2007 100%
Verification Complete 27-MAR-2007 26-APR-2007 26-APR-2007 100%
Analysis Complete 27-MAR-2007 Never* Never* 8%

*This analysis was not deemed necessary to meet any DO-178B objectives. Therefore, it was not/will not be performed.


Note: Unless noted otherwise, all estimates below are in terms of effort hours.

Certification Candidate

Task Dependency Assignee Risk Original Estimate Current Estimate Elapsed Remaining
2.1 Requirements development Requirements Capture & Agreement Harish None 4 3 3 0
2.2 Code development 2.1 Harish None 4 3 3 0
2.3 Ad-hoc Test development 2.1 Harish None 24 24 24 0
2.4 Certification Candidate - Release 2.3 Harish None 8 8 8 0
Totals 40 38 38 0

Verification

Task Dependency Assignee Risk Original Estimate Current Estimate Elapsed Remaining
3.1 Energize Review Status Files 2.4 Mitchell/Riedman None 13 15.5 15.5 0
3.2 Requirements review 2.1, 3.1 Horgan None 8 8 8 0
3.3 Test Case Development 2.1 Horgan None 8 12 12 0
3.4 Test Procedure Development 2.1, 2.3 Mitchell None 8 231 231 0
3.6 Code review 3.2 Horgan None 8 8 8 0
3.7 Test Case Review 3.2, 3.3 Mitchell None 8 40 40 0
3.8 Test Procedure Review 3.4, 3.7 Smith None 8 20 20 0
3.9 Software life cycle audit 3.8 Larson None 16 12 12 0
3.10 Requirements coverage analysis 3.6, 3.7 Cronk None 4 4 4 0
3.11 Conformity inspection - SQA build Witness 3.8, 3.10 Brunk/Cronk/Mitchell None 8 9 9 0
3.12 SCAT/ABC qualification 3.8 Cronk None 8 8 8 0
3.13 Integration review 3.11, 3.12 Cronk/Diethelm None 8 4 4 0
3.14 Run for score, including SQA witnessing, and test results review 3.13 Cronk/Diethelm None 8 8 8 0
3.15 Structural coverage analysis 3.14 Mitchell None 8 34 34 0
3.16 Verification audit 3.15 Kelly Leonard None 8 12 12 0
3.17 Certification documents: SAS, SLCECI, SCI 3.15 Cronk/Mitchell None 40 36 36 0
3.18 Population of certification archive (PCA) 3.17 Mitchell None 8 30.5 30.5 0
3.19 Software conformity audit 3.18 Kelly Leonard None 8 8 8 0
Totals 185 500 500 0

Review status summary

Analysis

This project arose from the discovery of an incorrect assumption by the AFDX Library requirements and code. That assumption was that an SNMP packet, with a valid checksum, would not contain erroneous/malicious data (such as incorrect length fields) and therefore no special checks were warranted when processing SNMP packets to protect against such errors. Since the aforementioned assumption has proven incorrect, it seems prudent to perform an analysis to ensure that no other assumptions of this type (i.e., one that would lead to the cessation of AFDX processing) exist.

Therefore, this analysis will consider all external interfaces and check to ensure that no implicit trust, with regards to the correctness of the data passed through that interface, exists. In other words, that the AFDX Library properly protects itself from senders of erroneous/malicious data. Checklist items are in place to ensure that all API data is validated before use, so for the purpose of this analysis, "interface" means hardware interface. Furthermore, since recieved packets are not "active" (non executable) hardware configuration and status registers cannot be affected, and hardware validated header information can be trusted. In other words, only payload ("packet data") that is actually processed within the AFDX Library needs to be reviewed.

Note: This does not imply that the AFDX Library will prevent erroneous/malicious data from being passed through to applications, rather the AFDX Library will not cease operation (e.g., hang) in the face of erroneous/malicious data.


Task Dependency Assignee Risk Original Estimate Current Estimate Elapsed Remaining
4.1 Analyze Implementation (per the above) 2.2 Larson 80 80 8 72
4.2 Document Discoveries 4.1 Larson 16 16 0 16
Totals 96 96 8 88

Risks

None currently.